Generic Instability of Majority Rule
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Cited in
(28)- Structural instability of the core
- On the generic emptiness of the local core of voting games
- On the core of voting games
- Bounds for mixed strategy equilibria and the spatial model of elections
- Necessary gradient restrictions at the core of a voting rule
- Toward a 50\%-majority equilibrium when voters are symmetrically distributed
- Singularity theory and core existence in the spatial model
- Dominance in spatial voting with imprecise ideals
- Two candidate competition on differentiated policy sets
- A critique of distributional analysis in the spatial model
- The ``probability of a fit choice
- Equilibrium existence for zero-sum games and spatial models of elections
- Stable coalition governments: the case of three political parties
- Electoral competition with policy-motivated candidates
- Social choice and electoral competition in the general spatial model
- The Condorcet paradox revisited
- Chaos, but in voting and apportionments?
- Coalitions and catastrophic climate change
- ``One and a half dimensional preferences and majority rule
- Siting noxious facilities: efficiency and majority rule decisions
- On the uniqueness of the yolk
- The probability of majority rule instability in the 2D Euclidean model with an even number of voters
- A ham sandwich theorem for general measures
- Classification theorem for smooth social choice on a manifold
- Endogenous voting agendas
- The Banks set in infinite spaces
- Repeated Downsian electoral competition
- Expert advice to a voting body
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