Structural instability of the core
Let \(\sigma\) be a q-rule, where any coalition of size q, from the society of size n, is decisive. Let \(w(n,q)=2q-n+1\) and let W be a smooth 'policy space' of dimension w. Let \(U(W)^ N\) be the space of all smooth profiles on W, endowed with the Whitney topology. It is shown that there exists an 'instability dimension' \(w^*(\sigma)\) with \(2\leq w^*(\sigma)\leq w(n,q)\) such that: (i) if \(w\geq w^*(\sigma)\), and W has no boundary, then the core of \(\sigma\) is empty for a dense set of profiles in \(U(W)^ N\) (i.e., almost always), (ii) if \(w\geq w^*(\sigma)+1\), and W has a boundary, then the core of \(\sigma\) is empty, almost always, (iii) if \(w\geq w^*(\sigma)+1\) then the cycle set is dense in W, almost always, (iv) if \(w\geq w^*(\sigma)+2\) then the cycle set is also path connected, almost always. The method of proof is first of all to show that if a point belongs to the core, then certain generalized symmetry conditions in terms of 'pivotal' coalitions of size 2q-n must be satisfied. Secondly, it is shown that these symmetry conditions can almost never be satisfied when either W has empty boundary and is of dimension w(n,q) or when W has non- empty boundary and is of dimension \(w(n,q)+1\).
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