Permutation cycles and manipulation of choice functions
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Publication:1083004
DOI10.1007/BF00435661zbMath0603.90012MaRDI QIDQ1083004
Publication date: 1986
Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)
voting rules; manipulation; smooth manifold; existence of a core; non-existence of cycles; social preference function; strict acyclic preferences
91B14: Social choice
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The stability set of voting games: Classification and genericity results, Structural instability of the core, On the core of voting games, Smooth social choice
Cites Work
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