Permutation cycles and manipulation of choice functions
If \(\sigma\) is a social preference function which assigns to profiles of strict acyclic preferences a strict preference, and if the set of alternatives W is finite with cardinality w, \(w<v(\sigma)=\) Nakamura number of \(\sigma\) is a necessary and sufficient condition for the non- existence of cycles and the existence of a core. Then it is shown that if \(w\geq v(\sigma)\) then \(\sigma\) can be manipulated (there exist cases in which a voter can improve the outcome for himself by reporting a false preference). Finally a similar result holds when W is a smooth manifold with dimension at least v(\(\sigma)\)-1.
- Minimal manipulability: unanimity and nondictatorship
- The geometry of manipulation -- a quantitative proof of the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem
- Minimal manipulability and interjacency for two-person social choice functions
- Minimal manipulability: anonymity and unanimity
- Manipulability measures of common social choice functions
- Classification theorem for smooth social choice on a manifold
- Consistent Majority Rules over Compact Sets of Alternatives
- Consistent Voting Systems
- Generic properties of simple Bergson-Samuelson welfare functions
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3825495 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3709875 (Why is no real title available?)
- Implementation of Democratic Social Choice Functions
- Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality
- Social equilibrium and cycles on compact sets
- The structure of continuous-valued neutral monotonic social functions
- The vetoers in a simple game with ordinal preferences
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