Permutation cycles and manipulation of choice functions

DOI10.1007/BF00435661MaRDI QIDQ1083004zbMATH OpenFDO

Authors Norman Schofield

Publication date 1986

Published in Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00435661

zbMATH Keywords

existence of a coremanipulationnon-existence of cyclessmooth manifoldsocial preference functionstrict acyclic preferencesvoting rules

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14)

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Cites work

• Classification theorem for smooth social choice on a manifold
• Consistent Majority Rules over Compact Sets of Alternatives
• Consistent Voting Systems
• Generic properties of simple Bergson-Samuelson welfare functions
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3825495 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3709875 (Why is no real title available?)
• Implementation of Democratic Social Choice Functions
• Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality
• Social equilibrium and cycles on compact sets
• The structure of continuous-valued neutral monotonic social functions
• The vetoers in a simple game with ordinal preferences

Cited in

(5)

• Structural instability of the core
• On the core of voting games
• Smooth social choice
• Social equilibrium and cycles on compact sets
• The stability set of voting games: Classification and genericity results

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