The stability set of voting games: Classification and genericity results
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Publication:803010
DOI10.1007/BF01761071zbMATH Open0726.90008OpenAlexW2006047365MaRDI QIDQ803010FDOQ803010
Authors: Michel Le Breton, Maurice Salles 
Publication date: 1990
Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/bf01761071
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Cites Work
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Cited In (18)
- On some combinatorial problems arising in the theory of voting games
- Preference aggregation theory without acyclicity: the core without majority dissatisfaction
- Committees with farsighted voters: A new interpretation of stable sets
- A note on the non-emptiness of the stability set when individual preferences are weak orders
- Stable outcomes in spatial voting games
- Coalitional stability with a credibility constraint
- Social choice and cooperative game theory: voting games as social aggregation functions
- A core of voting games with improved foresight
- Far-sightedness and the voting paradox
- Gillies and Miller's Subrelations of a Relation over an Infinite Set of Alternatives: General Results and Applications to Voting Games
- Stability of voting games
- The legislative calendar
- The stability set as a social choice correspondence.
- ON THE CHACTERISTIC NUMBERS OF VOTING GAMES
- Quota games and stability set of order \(d\)
- Bounds for the Nakamura number
- Noncooperative foundations of stable sets in voting games
- Cooperation, stability and social welfare under majority rule
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