The stability set of voting games: Classification and genericity results

DOI10.1007/BF01761071MaRDI QIDQ803010zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Michel Le Breton, Maurice Salles

Publication date 1990

Published in International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/bf01761071

zbMATH Keywords

nonemptinessvoting gamesstability setwinning coalitionsclassification results

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14) Cooperative games (91A12)

Recommendations

• On the emptiness of the stability set of order d
• A note on the non-emptiness of the stability set when individual preferences are weak orders
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Cites work

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• A Note about the "Nowhere Denseness" of Societies Having an Equilibrium under Majority Rule
• Balancedness, nonemptiness of the core and the existence of a majority equilibrium
• Choosing from a tournament
• Classification theorem for smooth social choice on a manifold
• Consistent Majority Rules over Compact Sets of Alternatives
• Consistent Voting Systems
• Gillies and Miller's Subrelations of a Relation over an Infinite Set of Alternatives: General Results and Applications to Voting Games
• Non-collegial simple games and the nowhere denseness of the set of preference profiles having a core
• On the core of voting games
• Permutation cycles and manipulation of choice functions
• Representations of simple games by social choice functions
• Social equilibrium and cycles on compact sets
• Stability of decision systems under majority rule
• Subsolutions and the Supercore of Cooperative Games
• The vetoers in a simple game with ordinal preferences

Cited in

(18)

• On some combinatorial problems arising in the theory of voting games
• Preference aggregation theory without acyclicity: the core without majority dissatisfaction
• Committees with farsighted voters: A new interpretation of stable sets
• A note on the non-emptiness of the stability set when individual preferences are weak orders
• Stable outcomes in spatial voting games
• Coalitional stability with a credibility constraint
• Social choice and cooperative game theory: voting games as social aggregation functions
• A core of voting games with improved foresight
• Far-sightedness and the voting paradox
• Gillies and Miller's Subrelations of a Relation over an Infinite Set of Alternatives: General Results and Applications to Voting Games
• Stability of voting games
• The stability set as a social choice correspondence.
• The legislative calendar
• ON THE CHACTERISTIC NUMBERS OF VOTING GAMES
• Quota games and stability set of order \(d\)
• Bounds for the Nakamura number
• Noncooperative foundations of stable sets in voting games
• Cooperation, stability and social welfare under majority rule

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