The stability set of voting games: Classification and genericity results (Q803010)

The stability set, introduced by \textit{A. Rubinstein} [J. Econ. Theory 23, 150-159 (1980; Zbl 0457.90007)], is a solution set for voting games. Given a set X of outcomes, let \(\gtrsim_ i\) denote individual i's preference ordering over X. Given a voting game \(G=(N,{\mathcal C})\), where N is the set of players, and \({\mathcal C}\) is the set of winning coalitions, \(\ll\) is a binary relation on \(X\times X\) satisfying: \(x\ll y\) if there exists \(C\in {\mathcal C}\) such that (i) \(x<_ iy\) for all \(i\in C\), and (ii) \(x\preccurlyeq_ iz\) for all \(i\in C\) and for all z such that \(y<_ jz\) for all j in some \(C'\in {\mathcal C}.\) The stability set is the set of alternatives in X which are undominated according to \(\ll\). The present paper obtains classification results for the nonemptiness of the stability set when X is finite. If X is infinite and preferences are continuous, it is shown that the set of preference profiles for which the stability set is nonempty is dense in the set of profiles.