Social equilibrium and cycles on compact sets (Q798550)

The object studied in the paper is a voting game \(\sigma\) in which each of the players i has a preference relation \(P_ i\) defined over the same set of alternatives W; special emphasis is given to the case of \(P_ i\) generated by (differentiable) utility functions \(u_ i.\) The principal aim of the paper is to investigate local solution concepts of the game determined mainly in terms of the derivatives of \(u_ i\) such as ''infinitesimal optima, infinitesimal cycles, local cycles, directional core'' etc. Additionally, the existence of a choice (i.e. an element of W optimal for players in a winning coalition) is also considered. According to the author's own estimation, the principal result of the paper is that if the dimension of W does not exceed the Nakamura number of \(\sigma\) minus 2 then there is a nonempty directional core at every point in W. Generally, the author tries to relax the assumptions which are standard within this framework (e.g. convexity to local acyclicity). The paper generalizes some earlier results including those due to \textit{J. Greenberg} [Econometrica 47, 627-636 (1979; Zbl 0423.90007)].