A note on the non-emptiness of the stability set when individual preferences are weak orders

DOI10.1016/J.MATHSOCSCI.2006.03.003MaRDI QIDQ855757zbMATH OpenOpenAlexWikidataFDO

Authors Nicolas Gabriel Andjiga, Issofa Moyouwou

Publication date 7 December 2006

Published in Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2006.03.003

zbMATH Keywords

weak ordersfundamental cyclesvoting gamesstability set

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Voting theory (91B12)

Recommendations

• On the emptiness of the stability set of order d
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Cites work

• A note on the non-emptiness of the stability set
• Stability of decision systems under majority rule
• The stability set as a social choice correspondence.
• The stability set of voting games: Classification and genericity results
• The vetoers in a simple game with ordinal preferences

Cited in

(5)

• A note on the non-emptiness of the stability set
• Preference aggregation theory without acyclicity: the core without majority dissatisfaction
• Necessary and sufficient conditions for l-stability of games in constitutional form
• Social choice and cooperative game theory: voting games as social aggregation functions
• A core of voting games with improved foresight

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