A note on the non-emptiness of the stability set when individual preferences are weak orders
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Publication:855757
DOI10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2006.03.003zbMath1141.91316OpenAlexW2028612444WikidataQ56767858 ScholiaQ56767858MaRDI QIDQ855757
Issofa Moyouwou, Nicolas Gabriel Andjiga
Publication date: 7 December 2006
Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2006.03.003
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