A note on the non-emptiness of the stability set when individual preferences are weak orders

DOI10.1016/J.MATHSOCSCI.2006.03.003zbMATH Open1141.91316OpenAlexW2028612444WikidataQ56767858 ScholiaQ56767858MaRDI QIDQ855757FDOQ855757

Authors: Nicolas Gabriel Andjiga, Issofa Moyouwou 

Publication date: 7 December 2006

Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2006.03.003

Recommendations

• On the emptiness of the stability set of order \(d\)
• The stability set of voting games: Classification and genericity results
• ON THE CHACTERISTIC NUMBERS OF VOTING GAMES
• The stability set as a social choice correspondence.
• A note on the core of voting games

zbMATH Keywords

weak ordersfundamental cyclesvoting gamesstability set

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Voting theory (91B12)

Cites Work

• The vetoers in a simple game with ordinal preferences
• Stability of decision systems under majority rule
• A note on the non-emptiness of the stability set
• The stability set of voting games: Classification and genericity results
• The stability set as a social choice correspondence.

Cited In (5)

• A note on the non-emptiness of the stability set
• Preference aggregation theory without acyclicity: the core without majority dissatisfaction
• Necessary and sufficient conditions for l-stability of games in constitutional form
• Social choice and cooperative game theory: voting games as social aggregation functions
• A core of voting games with improved foresight

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