Stability of decision systems under majority rule

Cites work

A Note about the "Nowhere Denseness" of Societies Having an Equilibrium under Majority Rule
Model theory
Social choice and individual values
Social Preference Orderings and Majority Rule
Stability in Voting
Stable Sets and Stable Points of Set-Valued Dynamic Systems with Applications to Game Theory
The core of a simple game with ordinal preferences

Cited in

(45)

Anonymous yes-no voting with abstention and multiple levels of approval
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Implementation via rights structures
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On the ordinal equivalence of the Jonhston, Banzhaf and Shapley-Shubik power indices for voting games with abstention
On the equilibrium of voting games with abstention and several levels of approval
Amplitude of weighted representation of voting games with several levels of approval
Far-sighted strong equilibrium and oligopoly
The legislative calendar
Constitutionally consistent voting rules over single-peaked domains
Quota games and stability set of order d
On credible coalitional deviations by prudent players
A policy-based rationalization of collective rules: dimensionality, specialized houses, and decentralized authority
Round-robin political tournaments: abstention, truthful equilibria, and effective power
Social choice and cooperative game theory: voting games as social aggregation functions
Achievable hierarchies in voting games with abstention
ON THE CHACTERISTIC NUMBERS OF VOTING GAMES
Stability and efficiency in perfect foresight situation
The influence relation for ternary voting games
Probabilistic power indices for voting rules with abstention
A theory of farsightedness in committee games
Preference aggregation theory without acyclicity: the core without majority dissatisfaction
A social choice theory of legitimacy
Political influence in multi-choice institutions: cyclicity, anonymity, and transitivity
The reciprocity set
Some characterizations of resolute majority rules
Axiomatization of some power indices in voting games with abstention
A behavioral test and classification of solution concepts in games
The stability of multi-dimensional rules
On the enumeration of resolute majority rules
Abstention, multiple issues, and the Banzhaf power index
A core of voting games with improved foresight
Banzhaf index for multiple voting systems. An application to the European Union
The stability set of voting games: Classification and genericity results
A note on the non-emptiness of the stability set when individual preferences are weak orders
Committees with farsighted voters: A new interpretation of stable sets
Manipulation in games with multiple levels of output
Cooperation, stability and social welfare under majority rule
Voters' power in voting games with abstention: Influence relation and ordinal equivalence of power theories
A characterization of social choice correspondences that implement the core of simple games
Anonymity, monotonicity, and quota pair systems

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