On credible coalitional deviations by prudent players
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Publication:2450087
DOI10.1007/s00355-011-0647-xzbMath1287.91046OpenAlexW2057538656MaRDI QIDQ2450087
Abderrahmane Ziad, Anindya Bhattacharya
Publication date: 16 May 2014
Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://www.york.ac.uk/media/economics/documents/discussionpapers/2009/0933.pdf
Cites Work
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- Dynamic legislative policy making
- Stability of decision systems under majority rule
- Farsighted coalitional stability
- Nonemptiness of the largest consistent set
- Coalitional stability under perfect foresight
- Coalition formation as a dynamic process.
- Farsightedness and cautiousness in coalition formation games with positive spillovers
- Coalitional stability with a credibility constraint
- Rationalizability for social environments
- Coalition formation among farsighted agents
- Strongly stable networks
- A strategic model of social and economic networks
- Coalitional Rationalizability*
- Multistage Situations
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