Rationalizability for social environments

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2003.11.003zbMath1099.91020OpenAlexW2099996416MaRDI QIDQ1886749

Vincent J. Vannetelbosch, Ana Mauleon, P. Jean-Jacques Herings

Publication date: 19 November 2004

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://cris.maastrichtuniversity.nl/ws/files/748385/guid-c1b9484d-b30c-4584-a202-c2fd765bf3c3-ASSET1.0.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

Coalition formationCoalitional rationalityExtensive-form rationalizabilityFarsightedness

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

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Cites Work

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• A Noncooperative View of Coalition Formation and the Core
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