Network formation with myopic and farsighted players

DOI10.1007/S00199-020-01288-8zbMath1484.91082OpenAlexW2909284917MaRDI QIDQ825176

Ana Mauleon, Chenghong Luo, Vincent J. Vannetelbosch

Publication date: 17 December 2021

Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-020-01288-8

zbMATH Keywords

networksstable setsdistance-based utilitydegree-based utilityegalitarian utilitymyopic and farsighted playerspositive convex externalities

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Games involving graphs (91A43) Utility theory (91B16) Utility theory for games (91A30)

Related Items (7)

Coalition-proof stable networks ⋮ Constrained-optimal tradewise-stable outcomes in the one-sided assignment game: a solution concept weaker than the core ⋮ Dynamics of diffusion on monoplex and multiplex networks: a message-passing approach ⋮ Social rationalizability with mediation ⋮ Limited farsightedness in R\&D network formation ⋮ Myopic-farsighted absorbing networks ⋮ Coordination on networks with farsighted and myopic agents

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