Coordination on networks with farsighted and myopic agents
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Publication:2100100
DOI10.1007/s00182-021-00802-zzbMath1505.91042OpenAlexW3145657535MaRDI QIDQ2100100
Simon Schopohl, Ana Mauleon, Vincent J. Vannetelbosch, Akylai Taalaibekova
Publication date: 21 November 2022
Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-021-00802-z
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