Stable sets in matching problems with coalitional sovereignty and path dominance
From MaRDI portal
(Redirected from Publication:2399671)
Recommendations
- Von Neumann-Morgenstern stable sets in matching problems
- von Neumann-Morgenstern farsightedly stable sets in two-sided matching
- A one-shot deviation principle for stability in matching problems
- Stability property of matchings is a natural solution concept in coalitional market games
- Three remarks on the many-to-many stable matching problem
Cites work
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 48303 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3558960 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3106184 (Why is no real title available?)
- A note on generalized stable sets
- A polynomial-time algorithm to find von Neumann-Morgenstern stable matchings in marriage games
- An Equilibrium-Point Interpretation of Stable Sets and a Proposed Alternative Definition
- College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
- Cores of convex games
- Credible group stability in many-to-many matching problems
- Endogenous Formation of Coalitions
- Farsighted coalitional stability
- Farsighted stability in hedonic games
- On the existence of stable roommate matchings
- Paths to stability for matching markets with couples
- Random Paths to Stability in Two-Sided Matching
- Random paths to pairwise stability in many-to-many matching problems: a study on market equilibration
- Random paths to stability in the roommate problem
- Strategic basins of attraction, the path dominance core, and network formation games
- The coalition structure core is accessible
- The evolution of social and economic networks.
- The farsighted stable set
- Von Neumann-Morgenstern stable sets in matching problems
- von Neumann-Morgenstern farsightedly stable sets in two-sided matching
Cited in
(19)- Stability properties of the core in a generalized assignment problem
- Farsighted stability with heterogeneous expectations
- Von Neumann-Morgenstern stable sets of a patent licensing game: the existence proof
- The myopic stable set for social environments
- Matching with myopic and farsighted players
- Stability of networks under horizon-\(K\) farsightedness
- Paths to stability for overlapping group structures
- The equivalence of the minimal dominant set and the myopic stable set for coalition function form games
- A bargaining set for roommate problems
- Myopic-farsighted absorbing networks
- Farsighted stability in patent licensing: an abstract game approach
- Dominance invariant one-to-one matching problems
- Network formation with myopic and farsighted players
- Cooperative games (von Neumann-Morgenstern stable sets)
- Von Neumann-Morgenstern stable sets in matching problems
- Stable cores in information graph games
- School choice with farsighted students
- Stable matching and protocol-free equilibrium
- Von Neumann-Morgenstern stable set rationalization of choice functions
This page was built for publication: Stable sets in matching problems with coalitional sovereignty and path dominance
Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q2399671)
