Stable sets in matching problems with coalitional sovereignty and path dominance

DOI10.1016/j.jmateco.2017.03.003zbMath1394.91303OpenAlexW2419684547MaRDI QIDQ2399671

Vincent J. Vannetelbosch, Ana Mauleon, P. Jean-Jacques Herings

Publication date: 24 August 2017

Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://cris.maastrichtuniversity.nl/en/publications/e9bfb68c-4b68-4575-9d63-59cea7abbc13

zbMATH Keywords

stable setsmatching problemscoalitional sovereigntyenforceabilitypath dominance

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Matching models (91B68)

Related Items (16)

Network formation with myopic and farsighted players ⋮ Von Neumann-Morgenstern stable sets of a patent licensing game: the existence proof ⋮ Farsighted stability with heterogeneous expectations ⋮ Stability properties of the core in a generalized assignment problem ⋮ Paths to stability for overlapping group structures ⋮ Von Neumann-Morgenstern stable set rationalization of choice functions ⋮ Myopic-farsighted absorbing networks ⋮ Matching with myopic and farsighted players ⋮ Cooperative Games (Von Neumann-Morgenstern Stable Sets) ⋮ Farsighted stability in patent licensing: an abstract game approach ⋮ The equivalence of the minimal dominant set and the myopic stable set for coalition function form games ⋮ Stable matching and protocol-free equilibrium ⋮ A bargaining set for roommate problems ⋮ The Myopic Stable Set for Social Environments ⋮ Stability of networks under horizon-\(K\) farsightedness ⋮ Stable cores in information graph games

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