Stable sets in matching problems with coalitional sovereignty and path dominance

DOI10.1016/J.JMATECO.2017.03.003zbMATH Open1394.91303OpenAlexW2419684547MaRDI QIDQ2399671FDOQ2399671

Authors: Ana Mauleon, Vincent Vannetelbosch, P. Jean-Jacques Herings 

Publication date: 24 August 2017

Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://cris.maastrichtuniversity.nl/en/publications/e9bfb68c-4b68-4575-9d63-59cea7abbc13

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zbMATH Keywords

stable setsmatching problemscoalitional sovereigntyenforceabilitypath dominance

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Matching models (91B68)

Cites Work

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• von Neumann-Morgenstern farsightedly stable sets in two-sided matching

Cited In (19)

• Stability properties of the core in a generalized assignment problem
• Farsighted stability with heterogeneous expectations
• Von Neumann-Morgenstern stable sets of a patent licensing game: the existence proof
• The myopic stable set for social environments
• Matching with myopic and farsighted players
• Stability of networks under horizon-\(K\) farsightedness
• Paths to stability for overlapping group structures
• The equivalence of the minimal dominant set and the myopic stable set for coalition function form games
• A bargaining set for roommate problems
• Myopic-farsighted absorbing networks
• Farsighted stability in patent licensing: an abstract game approach
• Dominance invariant one-to-one matching problems
• Network formation with myopic and farsighted players
• Cooperative games (von Neumann-Morgenstern stable sets)
• School choice with farsighted students
• Von Neumann-Morgenstern stable sets in matching problems
• Stable cores in information graph games
• Stable matching and protocol-free equilibrium
• Von Neumann-Morgenstern stable set rationalization of choice functions

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