Three remarks on the many-to-many stable matching problem
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Publication:1303882
DOI10.1016/S0165-4896(98)00048-1zbMath0951.91045OpenAlexW2070749268MaRDI QIDQ1303882
Publication date: 17 December 2000
Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/s0165-4896(98)00048-1
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Cites Work
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- The college admissions problem is not equivalent to the marriage problem
- Nonexistence of stable threesome matchings
- A nonconstructive elementary proof of the existence of stable marriages
- The lattice structure of the set of stable outcomes of the multiple partners assignment game
- Stability and Polarization of Interests in Job Matching
- The Lattice Structure of the Set of Stable Matchings with Multiple Partners
- Job Matching, Coalition Formation, and Gross Substitutes
- College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
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