Equivalences between two matching models: stability
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Publication:1714490
DOI10.3934/jdg.2018013zbMath1406.91281OpenAlexW2800458362MaRDI QIDQ1714490
Publication date: 1 February 2019
Published in: Journal of Dynamics and Games (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.3934/jdg.2018013
stabilitylattice structuresubstitutable preferencesmany-to-many matching modelresponsive preferences
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Cites Work
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