The Pareto-stability concept is a natural solution concept for discrete matching markets with indifferences

DOI10.1007/S00182-010-0259-1MaRDI QIDQ637586zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Marilda Sotomayor

Publication date 6 September 2011

Published in International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL http://hdl.handle.net/10419/62628

zbMATH Keywords

stable matchingPareto-optimalPareto-simple matchingPareto-stable matchingsimple matching

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Matching models (91B68)

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Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1617265 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 48303 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1405659 (Why is no real title available?)
• A nonconstructive elementary proof of the existence of stable marriages
• An elementary non-constructive proof of the non-emptiness of the core of the housing market of Shapley and Scarf
• College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
• Existence of stable outcomes and the lattice property for a unified matching market
• Implementation in the many-to-many matching market.
• Ms. Machiavelli and the Stable Matching Problem
• On cores and indivisibility
• Some remarks on the stable matching problem
• Stable marriage and indifference
• Stable marriage assignment for unequal sets
• The assignment game. I: The core
• Three remarks on the many-to-many stable matching problem

Cited in

(12)

• The difference between the weak core and the strong core from the design point of view
• A new solution concept for the roommate problem: \(\mathcal{Q}\)-stable matchings
• Core and stability notions in many-to-one matching markets with indifferences
• Pareto stability in two-sided many-to-many matching with weak preferences
• Stable matchings in the marriage model with indifferences
• Two-Sided Matching Models
• Constrained-optimal tradewise-stable outcomes in the one-sided assignment game: a solution concept weaker than the core
• Modeling cooperative decision situations: the deviation function form and the equilibrium concept
• Pareto stable matchings under one-sided matroid constraints
• Stability property of matchings is a natural solution concept in coalitional market games
• Pareto efficient matchings with pairwise preferences
• A new approach to the Pareto stable matching problem

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