The Pareto-stability concept is a natural solution concept for discrete matching markets with indifferences
From MaRDI portal
Publication:637586
DOI10.1007/s00182-010-0259-1zbMath1220.91025OpenAlexW2085172139MaRDI QIDQ637586
Publication date: 6 September 2011
Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/62628
Related Items
A new solution concept for the roommate problem: \(\mathcal{Q}\)-stable matchings ⋮ Modeling cooperative decision situations: the deviation function form and the equilibrium concept ⋮ Constrained-optimal tradewise-stable outcomes in the one-sided assignment game: a solution concept weaker than the core ⋮ Pareto efficient matchings with pairwise preferences ⋮ Pareto stability in two-sided many-to-many matching with weak preferences ⋮ Core and stability notions in many-to-one matching markets with indifferences ⋮ Two-Sided Matching Models ⋮ Stable matchings in the marriage model with indifferences ⋮ Pareto Stable Matchings under One-Sided Matroid Constraints ⋮ A New Approach to the Pareto Stable Matching Problem
Cites Work
- Unnamed Item
- Unnamed Item
- Unnamed Item
- Some remarks on the stable matching problem
- Three remarks on the many-to-many stable matching problem
- Stable marriage and indifference
- Implementation in the many-to-many matching market.
- On cores and indivisibility
- A nonconstructive elementary proof of the existence of stable marriages
- Existence of stable outcomes and the lattice property for a unified matching market
- The assignment game. I: The core
- An elementary non-constructive proof of the non-emptiness of the core of the housing market of Shapley and Scarf
- Ms. Machiavelli and the Stable Matching Problem
- Stable marriage assignment for unequal sets
- College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
