The Pareto-stability concept is a natural solution concept for discrete matching markets with indifferences
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Publication:637586
DOI10.1007/S00182-010-0259-1zbMATH Open1220.91025OpenAlexW2085172139MaRDI QIDQ637586FDOQ637586
Authors: Marilda Sotomayor 
Publication date: 6 September 2011
Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/62628
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Cites Work
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Cited In (11)
- A new solution concept for the roommate problem: \(\mathcal{Q}\)-stable matchings
- Core and stability notions in many-to-one matching markets with indifferences
- Pareto Stable Matchings under One-Sided Matroid Constraints
- Pareto stability in two-sided many-to-many matching with weak preferences
- Stable matchings in the marriage model with indifferences
- Two-Sided Matching Models
- Constrained-optimal tradewise-stable outcomes in the one-sided assignment game: a solution concept weaker than the core
- A New Approach to the Pareto Stable Matching Problem
- Modeling cooperative decision situations: the deviation function form and the equilibrium concept
- Stability property of matchings is a natural solution concept in coalitional market games
- Pareto efficient matchings with pairwise preferences
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