The lattice of envy-free many-to-many matchings with contracts

DOI10.1007/S11238-023-09940-0MaRDI QIDQ6145086zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Agustín G. Bonifacio, Nadia Guiñazú, Noelia Juarez, Pablo Neme, Jorge Oviedo

Publication date 30 January 2024

Published in Theory and Decision (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://arxiv.org/abs/2206.10758

zbMATH Keywords

envy-freenesslatticematching with contractsre-equilibration processTarski operatorvacancy chain

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32) Contract theory (moral hazard, adverse selection) (91B41) Matching models (91B68)

Abstract: We study envy-free allocations in a many-to-many matching model with contracts in which agents on one side of the market (doctors) are endowed with substitutable choice functions and agents on the other side of the market (hospitals) are endowed with responsive preferences. Envy-freeness is a weakening of stability that allows blocking contracts involving a hospital with a vacant position and a doctor that does not envy any of the doctors that the hospital currently employs. We show that the set of envy-free allocations has a lattice structure. Furthermore, we define a Tarski operator on this lattice and use it to model a vacancy chain dynamic process by which, starting from any envy-free allocation, a stable one is reached.

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Cited in

(2)

• Quasi-stability notions in two-sided matching models
• On the existence of stable matchings with contracts

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