On the exhaustiveness of truncation and dropping strategies in many-to-many matching markets

DOI10.1007/S00355-013-0746-YzbMATH Open1302.91156OpenAlexW3124650609MaRDI QIDQ404743FDOQ404743

Paula Jaramillo, Çağatay Kayı, Flip Klijn

Publication date: 4 September 2014

Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://repository.urosario.edu.co/handle/10336/10830

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Matching models (91B68)

Cites Work

• Title not available (Why is that?)
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Cited In (4)

• A many-to-many `rural hospital theorem'
• Static versus dynamic deferred acceptance in school choice: theory and experiment
• Nash implementation on the basis of general priorities
• Equilibria under deferred acceptance: dropping strategies, filled positions, and welfare

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