On the exhaustiveness of truncation and dropping strategies in many-to-many matching markets
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Cites work
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 48303 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1488104 (Why is no real title available?)
- A Fixed-Point Approach to Stable Matchings and Some Applications
- A class of multipartner matching markets with a strong lattice structure
- A many-to-many `rural hospital theorem'
- An algorithm to compute the full set of many-to-many stable matchings.
- College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
- Conflict and Coincidence of Interest in Job Matching: Some New Results and Open Questions
- Credible group stability in many-to-many matching problems
- Implementation in the many-to-many matching market.
- Incentives in two-sided matching with random stable mechanisms
- Job Matching, Coalition Formation, and Gross Substitutes
- Machiavelli and the Gale-Shapley Algorithm
- Manipulability in matching markets: conflict and coincidence of interests
- Manipulation via capacities in two-sided matching markets
- Many-to-many matching: stable polyandrous polygamy (or polygamous polyandry)
- On preferences over subsets and the lattice structure of stable matchings
- Optimal truncation in matching markets
- Stability and Polarization of Interests in Job Matching
- Stable many-to-many matchings with contracts
- The College Admissions Problem Revisited
- The Economics of Matching: Stability and Incentives
- The Lattice Structure of the Set of Stable Matchings with Multiple Partners
- The college admissions problem is not equivalent to the marriage problem
- The lattice structure of the set of stable outcomes of the multiple partners assignment game
- The singleton core in the college admissions problem and its application to the national resident matching program (NRMP)
- Three remarks on the many-to-many stable matching problem
- Truncation strategies in matching markets
Cited in
(8)- A many-to-many `rural hospital theorem'
- Optimal truncation in matching markets
- Static versus dynamic deferred acceptance in school choice: theory and experiment
- Truncation strategies in two-sided matching markets: theory and experiment
- Nash implementation on the basis of general priorities
- Implications of capacity reduction and entry in many-to-one stable matching
- Truncation strategies in matching markets
- Equilibria under deferred acceptance: dropping strategies, filled positions, and welfare
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