scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1488104

zbMATH Open0959.91021MaRDI QIDQ4495210FDOQ4495210

Authors: Ahmet U. Alkan 

Publication date: 10 August 2000

Title of this publication is not available (Why is that?)

Recommendations

• The stability of many-to-many matching with max-min preferences
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• Many-to-many matching: stable polyandrous polygamy (or polygamous polyandry)

zbMATH Keywords

complete distributive latticeresponsive preferencesstable many-to-many matchings

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Matching models (91B68)

Cited In (14)

• Ordinal Maximin Share Approximation for Goods
• On the exhaustiveness of truncation and dropping strategies in many-to-many matching markets
• A many-to-many `rural hospital theorem'
• Two-sided strategy-proofness in many-to-many matching markets
• On the set of many-to-one strongly stable fractional matchings
• Unique stability in simple coalition formation games
• Credible group stability in many-to-many matching problems
• Many-to-many matching with max-min preferences
• Cycles to compute the full set of many-to-many stable matchings
• Finding all stable pairs and solutions to the many-to-many stable matching problem
• On lattice and DA
• Random paths to pairwise stability in many-to-many matching problems: a study on market equilibration
• Agreement toward stability in matching markets
• Stability, optimality and manipulation in matching problems with weighted preferences

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