scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1488104
From MaRDI portal
Publication:4495210
zbMATH Open0959.91021MaRDI QIDQ4495210FDOQ4495210
Authors: Ahmet U. Alkan
Publication date: 10 August 2000
Title of this publication is not available (Why is that?)
Recommendations
- The stability of many-to-many matching with max-min preferences
- Many-to-many matching with max-min preferences
- On the lattice structure of the set of stable matchings for a many-to-one model∗
- Equivalences between two matching models: stability
- Many-to-many matching: stable polyandrous polygamy (or polygamous polyandry)
Cited In (14)
- Ordinal Maximin Share Approximation for Goods
- On the exhaustiveness of truncation and dropping strategies in many-to-many matching markets
- A many-to-many `rural hospital theorem'
- Two-sided strategy-proofness in many-to-many matching markets
- On the set of many-to-one strongly stable fractional matchings
- Unique stability in simple coalition formation games
- Credible group stability in many-to-many matching problems
- Many-to-many matching with max-min preferences
- Cycles to compute the full set of many-to-many stable matchings
- Finding all stable pairs and solutions to the many-to-many stable matching problem
- On lattice and DA
- Random paths to pairwise stability in many-to-many matching problems: a study on market equilibration
- Agreement toward stability in matching markets
- Stability, optimality and manipulation in matching problems with weighted preferences
This page was built for publication:
Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q4495210)