On lattice and DA
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Publication:4606763
DOI10.1007/978-3-319-32543-9_3zbMATH Open1407.91178OpenAlexW2493800895MaRDI QIDQ4606763FDOQ4606763
Authors: David Cantala 
Publication date: 9 March 2018
Published in: Trends in Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-32543-9_3
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Cites Work
- Title not available (Why is that?)
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- College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
- Stable schedule matching under revealed preference.
- A class of multipartner matching markets with a strong lattice structure
- Job Matching, Coalition Formation, and Gross Substitutes
- A Fixed-Point Approach to Stable Matchings and Some Applications
- Combinatorial auctions. Foreword by Vernon L. Smith.
- The Lattice Structure of the Set of Stable Matchings with Multiple Partners
- On the lattice structure of the set of stable matchings for a many-to-one model∗
- On preferences over subsets and the lattice structure of stable matchings
- Many-to-many matching: stable polyandrous polygamy (or polygamous polyandry)
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Core many-to-one matchings by fixed-point methods
Cited In (2)
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