On lattice and DA
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Publication:4606763
Recommendations
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Cites work
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 48303 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3558960 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1488104 (Why is no real title available?)
- A Fixed-Point Approach to Stable Matchings and Some Applications
- A class of multipartner matching markets with a strong lattice structure
- College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
- Combinatorial auctions. Foreword by Vernon L. Smith.
- Core many-to-one matchings by fixed-point methods
- Job Matching, Coalition Formation, and Gross Substitutes
- Many-to-many matching: stable polyandrous polygamy (or polygamous polyandry)
- On preferences over subsets and the lattice structure of stable matchings
- On the lattice structure of the set of stable matchings for a many-to-one model∗
- Stable schedule matching under revealed preference.
- The Lattice Structure of the Set of Stable Matchings with Multiple Partners
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