On Lattice and DA
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Publication:4606763
DOI10.1007/978-3-319-32543-9_3zbMath1407.91178OpenAlexW2493800895MaRDI QIDQ4606763
Publication date: 9 March 2018
Published in: Trends in Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-32543-9_3
Cites Work
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