The stability of many-to-many matching with max-min preferences

DOI10.1016/J.ECONLET.2015.02.009MaRDI QIDQ500490zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Guoqiang Tian, Zhenhua Jiao

Publication date 5 October 2015

Published in Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2015.02.009

zbMATH Keywords

coremany-to-many matchingmax-min preferencespairwise-stabilitysetwise-stability

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Matching models (91B68)

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Cites work

• College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
• Games of capacity manipulation in hospital-intern markets
• Job Matching, Coalition Formation, and Gross Substitutes
• Many-to-many matching with max-min preferences
• Many-to-many matching: stable polyandrous polygamy (or polygamous polyandry)
• Stable many-to-many matchings with contracts
• The college admissions problem is not equivalent to the marriage problem
• Three remarks on the many-to-many stable matching problem

Cited in

(19)

• Core and stability notions in many-to-one matching markets with indifferences
• Hedonic games related to many-to-one matching problems
• Finding a minimum-regret many-to-many Stable Matching
• Implementation in the many-to-many matching market.
• A one-sided many-to-many matching problem
• Equivalence of two-sided stable matching
• On the invariance of the set of core matchings with respect to preference profiles
• Credible group stability in many-to-many matching problems
• The blocking lemma and strategy-proofness in many-to-many matchings
• Improving man-optimal stable matchings by minimum change of preference lists
• Stability, optimality and manipulation in matching problems with weighted preferences
• Stability of matchings when individuals have preferences over colleagues
• \(d\)-dimensional stable matching with cyclic preferences
• Many-to-One Stable Matching: Geometry and Fairness
• Stability and strategy-proofness for matching with constraints: A necessary and sufficient condition
• A many-to-many `rural hospital theorem'
• Transfers and exchange-stability in two-sided matching problems
• Strong core and Pareto-optimality in the multiple partners matching problem under lexicographic preference domains
• Many-to-many matching with max-min preferences

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