Hedonic games related to many-to-one matching problems

DOI10.1007/S00355-011-0559-9MaRDI QIDQ2450143zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Juan C. Cesco

Publication date 16 May 2014

Published in Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-011-0559-9

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Matching models (91B68)

Recommendations

• Three remarks on the many-to-many stable matching problem
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Cites work

• College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
• Core in a simple coalition formation game
• Core many-to-one matchings by fixed-point methods
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 48303 (Why is no real title available?)
• The core-partition of a hedonic game
• The stability of hedonic coalition structures
• Unique stability in simple coalition formation games

Cited in

(4)

• Constitutions and groups
• On one-sided versus two-sided matching games
• Hedonic diversity games revisited
• Subordinated hedonic games

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