Ms. Machiavelli and the Stable Matching Problem
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(86)- Equilibria of two-sided matching games with common preferences
- Some remarks on the stable matching problem
- A further note on the stable matching problem
- Interior points in the core of two-sided matching markets
- Stable matchings and equilibrium outcomes of the Gale-Shapley's algorithm for the marriage problem
- Short-run stable matchings between bees and flowers
- Two-sided matching with incomplete information about others' preferences
- Incentives in two-sided matching with random stable mechanisms
- Implementation in the many-to-many matching market.
- Single agents and the set of many-to-one stable matchings
- A simple selling and buying procedure
- Stable matching mechanisms are not obviously strategy-proof
- Lone wolves in infinite, discrete matching markets
- Strategy-proofness of worker-optimal matching with continuously transferable utility
- Competitive pricing and the core: with reference to matching
- Equilibria of deferred acceptance with complete lists
- Gender consistent resolving rules in marriage problems
- Static versus dynamic deferred acceptance in school choice: theory and experiment
- Welfare and incentives in partitioned school choice markets
- Stability, optimality and manipulation in matching problems with weighted preferences
- Relationship between matching and assignment problems
- Protective behavior in matching models
- Stable matching with preferences derived from a psychological model
- Sisterhood in the Gale-Shapley matching algorithm
- Substitutes and stability for matching with contracts
- Cheating strategies for the Gale-Shapley algorithm with complete preference lists
- Many-to-many matching: stable polyandrous polygamy (or polygamous polyandry)
- Subgame perfect equilibria under the deferred acceptance algorithm
- Coalitional permutation manipulations in the Gale-Shapley algorithm
- Stability of equilibrium outcomes under deferred acceptance: acyclicity and dropping strategies
- Bipartite choices
- The stable marriage problem: an interdisciplinary review from the physicist's perspective
- Responsive affirmative action in school choice: a comparison study
- Unraveling results from comparable demand and supply: an experimental investigation
- The outcome of competitive equilibrium rules in buyer-seller markets when the agents play strategically
- Games of capacity manipulation in hospital-intern markets
- Imperfect competition in two-sided matching markets
- Equilibria under deferred acceptance: dropping strategies, filled positions, and welfare
- Hedonic games related to many-to-one matching problems
- Games with capacity manipulation: incentives and Nash equilibria
- Characterizations of the optimal stable allocation mechanism
- The stability of the equilibrium outcomes in the admission games induced by stable matching rules
- Descending the stable matching lattice: how many strategic agents are required to turn pessimality to optimality?
- Enrollment manipulations in school choice
- Nash equilibrium in stable matching problems
- Implementation of the core in college admissions problems when colleagues matter
- Fair implementation of diversity in school choice
- On classical and modern marriage problems
- Stable matching with special preference patterns
- When Can Manipulations be Avoided in Two-Sided Matching Markets? -- Maximal Domain Results
- Bargaining and Competition in Matching Markets
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 48303 (Why is no real title available?)
- Fictitious students creation incentives in school choice problems
- Let them cheat!
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1342147 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1841882 (Why is no real title available?)
- On the existence of a strictly strong Nash equilibrium under the student-optimal deferred acceptance algorithm
- Stability with one-sided incomplete information
- The marriage problem with interdependent preferences
- Two-Sided Matching Models
- Algorithmic aspects of equilibria of stable marriage model with complete preference lists
- Incentive compatibility for the stable matching model with an entrance criterion
- Total stability in stable matching games
- Sex-oriented stable matchings of the marriage problem with correlated and incomplete information
- Stable marriages
- ``Sex-equal stable matchings
- Review of the theory of stable matchings and contract systems
- A simple matching domain with indifferences and a master list
- Unique stable matchings
- Bargaining cum voice
- The Pareto-stability concept is a natural solution concept for discrete matching markets with indifferences
- Large random matching markets with localized preference structures can exhibit large cores
- A further note on the college admission game
- Finding all stable matchings with assignment constraints
- Lone wolves just got lonelier
- Stable matching games: manipulation via subgraph isomorphism
- Existence of myopic-farsighted stable sets in matching markets
- Truncation strategies in two-sided matching markets: theory and experiment
- Constrained school choice
- Matching markets under (in)complete information
- Sincere and sophisticated players in an equal-income market
- On Marilda Sotomayor's extraordinary contribution to matching theory
- Finding all stable matchings with couples
- Why do stable clearinghouses work so well? -- Small sets of stable matchings in typical environments, and the limits-on-manipulation theorem of Demange, Gale and Sotomayor
- On the invariance of male optimal stable matching
- Core structure and comparative statics in a hybrid matching market
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