Total stability in stable matching games

DOI10.4230/LIPICS.SWAT.2016.23MaRDI QIDQ5369525zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Sushmita Gupta, Shuichi Miyazaki, Kazuo Iwama

Publication date 17 October 2017

Full work available at URL https://drops.dagstuhl.de/opus/volltexte/2016/6045/pdf/LIPIcs-SWAT-2016-23.pdf/

zbMATH Keywords

Gale-Shapley algorithmmanipulationNash equilibriumstabilitystable matching

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Analysis of algorithms and problem complexity (68Q25) Noncooperative games (91A10) Matching models (91B68)

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