The stability of the equilibrium outcomes in the admission games induced by stable matching rules
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Publication:2482680
DOI10.1007/S00182-008-0115-8zbMATH Open1143.91043OpenAlexW1971380014MaRDI QIDQ2482680FDOQ2482680
Authors: Marilda Sotomayor 
Publication date: 23 April 2008
Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-008-0115-8
Recommendations
- Total stability in stable matching games
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- Probabilistic stable rules and Nash equilibrium in two-sided matching problems
- Incentive compatibility for the stable matching model with an entrance criterion
- Stabilization of capacitated matching games
- Stability property of matchings is a natural solution concept in coalitional market games
- Stable matching and protocol-free equilibrium
- Stable matchings and rematching-proof equilibria in a two-sided matching market
- A necessary and sufficient condition for stable matching rules to be strategy-proof
- Nash equilibrium in stable matching problems
Cites Work
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Some remarks on the stable matching problem
- College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
- The college admissions problem is not equivalent to the marriage problem
- Ms. Machiavelli and the Stable Matching Problem
- The College Admissions Problem Revisited
- A tale of two mechanisms: Student placement
- The Strategy Structure of Two-Sided Matching Markets
- Implementation of stable solutions to marriage problems
- Three remarks on the many-to-many stable matching problem
- On two competing mechanisms for priority-based allocation problems
- Reaching the core of the marriage market through a non-revelation matching mechanism
- Hiring procedures to implement stable allocations
- Misrepresentation and stability in the marriage problem
- A nonconstructive elementary proof of the existence of stable marriages
- Simple mechanisms to implement the core of college admissions problems
Cited In (14)
- Games with capacity manipulation: incentives and Nash equilibria
- Deferred acceptance algorithm with retrade
- An analysis of the German university admissions system
- Two-Sided Matching Models
- When does an additional stage improve welfare in centralized assignment?
- Probabilistic stable rules and Nash equilibrium in two-sided matching problems
- On the existence of a strictly strong Nash equilibrium under the student-optimal deferred acceptance algorithm
- Nash implementation on the basis of general priorities
- On Marilda Sotomayor's extraordinary contribution to matching theory
- Stability and the immediate acceptance rule when school priorities are weak
- Equilibria under deferred acceptance: dropping strategies, filled positions, and welfare
- The outcome of competitive equilibrium rules in buyer-seller markets when the agents play strategically
- A further note on the college admission game
- Subgame perfect equilibria under the deferred acceptance algorithm
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