The stability of the equilibrium outcomes in the admission games induced by stable matching rules

DOI10.1007/s00182-008-0115-8zbMath1143.91043OpenAlexW1971380014MaRDI QIDQ2482680

Marilda Sotomayor

Publication date: 23 April 2008

Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-008-0115-8

zbMATH Keywords

Nash equilibriumstable matchingadmission gamerandom stable matching rulestable matching rule

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Game theory (91A99) Matching models (91B68)

Related Items (13)

The outcome of competitive equilibrium rules in buyer-seller markets when the agents play strategically ⋮ An analysis of the German university admissions system ⋮ Stability and the immediate acceptance rule when school priorities are weak ⋮ When does an additional stage improve welfare in centralized assignment? ⋮ On Marilda Sotomayor's extraordinary contribution to matching theory ⋮ Equilibria under deferred acceptance: dropping strategies, filled positions, and welfare ⋮ Games with capacity manipulation: incentives and Nash equilibria ⋮ A further note on the college admission game ⋮ On the existence of a strictly strong Nash equilibrium under the student-optimal deferred acceptance algorithm ⋮ Two-Sided Matching Models ⋮ Subgame perfect equilibria under the deferred acceptance algorithm ⋮ Nash implementation on the basis of general priorities ⋮ Deferred acceptance algorithm with retrade

Cites Work

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• Some remarks on the stable matching problem
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• Reaching the core of the marriage market through a non-revelation matching mechanism
• Simple mechanisms to implement the core of college admissions problems
• A nonconstructive elementary proof of the existence of stable marriages
• Implementation of stable solutions to marriage problems
• On two competing mechanisms for priority-based allocation problems
• The Strategy Structure of Two-Sided Matching Markets
• Ms. Machiavelli and the Stable Matching Problem
• The College Admissions Problem Revisited
• College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage

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