The stability of the equilibrium outcomes in the admission games induced by stable matching rules
The paper deals with a cooperative model known as the school choice model. Under this model and similarly to the College admission model, a set of students and a set of graduate centres are considered. Each student can be enrolled in one centre at most, while all centres have quotas. The students have ordered lists of preferences over the centres, and a given procedure is used by the centres to evaluate the students. The students are ranked by each centre according to the result of its evaluation procedure, and this ranking defines the preference list of the centre, over the students. For the model described above, the author considers a strategic game, called admission game, induced by a revelation mechanism defined by a stable matching rule. Due to the restriction on the preferences of the centres imposed by the market, these game participants behave straightforwardly, while the students' strategies are given by their preferences over the graduate centres. Given these, the paper deals with the following question: if at equilibrium, when students behave strategically, the mechanism continues to yield stable matchings with respect to the true preferences, just as it does when the students reveal their true preferences? Starting from the aforementioned question, the paper shows that the centre-optimal stable matching rule implements the set of stable matchings via the Nash equilibrium concept. For any other stable matching rule, however, the stability of the equilibrium outcomes may be lost. In fact, it is shown that for the student-optimal stable matching rule, the strategic behaviour of the students may lead to outcomes that are not stable under the true preferences. Then, uncertainty is introduced about the matching selected and it is proved that the natural solution concept is that of Nash equilibrium in the strong sense. Another general result shows that any stable matching rule, as well as the random stable matching rule, implements the set of stable matchings via the concept of Nash equilibrium in the strong sense and the student-optimal stable matching under the true preferences is the equilibrium outcome most preferred by the students. Finally, for the case where the students play, in equilibrium, truncations of the true preferences, additionally obtained results imply that the only Nash equilibrium outcome in the strong sense is the student-optimal stable matching rule under the true preferences. Furthermore, a profile of truncations of the true preferences is a strong equilibrium point for every stable matching rule, if and only if it determines a singleton set of stable matchings, whose only element is the student-optimal stable matching under the true preferences. As a consequence, if the students only play truncations of the true preference lists, then any stable matching rule implements the student-optimal stable matching under the true preferences in strong equilibrium in the strong sense and in Nash equilibrium in the strong sense.
- Total stability in stable matching games
- Stable matchings and the small core in Nash equilibrium in the college admissions problem.
- Probabilistic stable rules and Nash equilibrium in two-sided matching problems
- Incentive compatibility for the stable matching model with an entrance criterion
- Stabilization of capacitated matching games
- Stability property of matchings is a natural solution concept in coalitional market games
- Stable matching and protocol-free equilibrium
- Stable matchings and rematching-proof equilibria in a two-sided matching market
- A necessary and sufficient condition for stable matching rules to be strategy-proof
- Nash equilibrium in stable matching problems
- A nonconstructive elementary proof of the existence of stable marriages
- A tale of two mechanisms: Student placement
- College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
- Hiring procedures to implement stable allocations
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 48303 (Why is no real title available?)
- Implementation of stable solutions to marriage problems
- Misrepresentation and stability in the marriage problem
- Ms. Machiavelli and the Stable Matching Problem
- On two competing mechanisms for priority-based allocation problems
- Reaching the core of the marriage market through a non-revelation matching mechanism
- Simple mechanisms to implement the core of college admissions problems
- Some remarks on the stable matching problem
- The college admissions problem is not equivalent to the marriage problem
- The College Admissions Problem Revisited
- The Strategy Structure of Two-Sided Matching Markets
- Three remarks on the many-to-many stable matching problem
- Implementation of college admission rules
- Stability and the immediate acceptance rule when school priorities are weak
- Subgame perfect equilibria under the deferred acceptance algorithm
- Nash implementation on the basis of general priorities
- Deferred acceptance algorithm with retrade
- The outcome of competitive equilibrium rules in buyer-seller markets when the agents play strategically
- Equilibria under deferred acceptance: dropping strategies, filled positions, and welfare
- Games with capacity manipulation: incentives and Nash equilibria
- An analysis of the German university admissions system
- On the existence of a strictly strong Nash equilibrium under the student-optimal deferred acceptance algorithm
- Two-Sided Matching Models
- Probabilistic stable rules and Nash equilibrium in two-sided matching problems
- When does an additional stage improve welfare in centralized assignment?
- A further note on the college admission game
- Nash implementation in a many-to-one matching market
- On Marilda Sotomayor's extraordinary contribution to matching theory
This page was built for publication: The stability of the equilibrium outcomes in the admission games induced by stable matching rules
Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q2482680)
