Deferred acceptance algorithm with retrade

DOI10.1016/J.MATHSOCSCI.2022.08.004MaRDI QIDQ2108764zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Akihiko Matsui, Megumi Murakami

Publication date 20 December 2022

Published in Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2022.08.004

zbMATH Keywords

cyclical prioritydeferred acceptance algorithm (DA) with retrademinimum demandperfect market equilibrium (PME)reversed priority

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Multistage and repeated games (91A20) Mechanism design theory (91B03)

Recommendations

• Axioms for deferred acceptance
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Cites work

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• The Economics of Matching: Stability and Incentives
• The assignment game. I: The core
• The existence and computation of competitive equilibria in markets with an indivisible commodity
• The stability of the equilibrium outcomes in the admission games induced by stable matching rules
• Weak versus strong domination in a market with indivisible goods

Cited in

(2)

• Maximal domains for strategy-proof pairwise exchange
• Retrading in market games.

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