Stability in dynamic matching markets
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Publication:2387312
DOI10.1016/j.geb.2004.06.014zbMath1099.91076MaRDI QIDQ2387312
Publication date: 2 September 2005
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2004.06.014
Related Items
Time horizons, lattice structures, and welfare in multi-period matching markets, Many-to-one matching markets with externalities among firms
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