Coalitional stability with a credibility constraint

DOI10.1016/S0165-4896(01)00078-6MaRDI QIDQ1867798zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Anindya Bhattacharya

Publication date 2 April 2003

Published in Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/s0165-4896(01)00078-6

zbMATH Keywords

credibly consistent setsproper simple games

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12)

Recommendations

• Farsighted coalitional stability
• Credible coalitions and the core
• A note on the impossibility of a satisfactory concept of stability for coalition formation games
• Definition of stable coalitions and coalition structures
• Maximality in the farsighted stable set

Cites work

• A consistent bargaining set
• Coalitional stability under perfect foresight
• Covering sets and a new Condorcet choice correspondence
• Equilibrium binding agreements
• Far-sightedness and the voting paradox
• Farsighted coalitional stability
• Nonemptiness of the largest consistent set
• Stability of decision systems under majority rule
• Stability of voting games
• The stability set of voting games: Classification and genericity results

Cited in

(8)

• Necessary and sufficient conditions for l-stability of games in constitutional form
• Farsighted coalitional stability
• On coalition formation: durable coalition structures.
• The stability set as a social choice correspondence.
• Stability in dynamic matching markets
• On credible coalitional deviations by prudent players
• Credible coalitions and the core
• Accessibility and stability of the coalition structure core

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