Coalitional stability with a credibility constraint
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Publication:1867798
DOI10.1016/S0165-4896(01)00078-6zbMath1021.91003MaRDI QIDQ1867798
Publication date: 2 April 2003
Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/s0165-4896(01)00078-6
91A12: Cooperative games
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On coalition formation: durable coalition structures., The stability set as a social choice correspondence., Stability in dynamic matching markets, On credible coalitional deviations by prudent players
Cites Work
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