Nonemptiness of the largest consistent set

DOI10.1006/jeth.1996.2242zbMath0879.90018OpenAlexW1966270535MaRDI QIDQ1357588

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Publication date: 10 June 1997

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1006/jeth.1996.2242

zbMATH Keywords

nonemptinesslargest consistent set

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14)

Related Items (15)

Stable coalition structures in symmetric majority games: a coincidence between myopia and farsightedness ⋮ On the non-emptiness of the one-core and the bargaining set of committee games ⋮ Supermajority politics: equilibrium range, policy diversity, utilitarian welfare, and political compromise ⋮ Coalition formation under dominance invariance ⋮ A theory of farsightedness in committee games ⋮ On credible coalitional deviations by prudent players ⋮ Cooperative Games (Von Neumann-Morgenstern Stable Sets) ⋮ Stability, sequential rationality, and subgame consistency ⋮ Dynamic coalitional equilibrium ⋮ The projective core of symmetric games with externalities ⋮ Conservative stable standards of behavior and \(\varphi\)-stable sets ⋮ General systems and \(\varphi\)-stable sets --- a formal analysis of socioeconomic environments ⋮ Implementation in largest consistent set via rights structures ⋮ Farsighted coalitional stability in TU-games ⋮ Coalitional stability with a credibility constraint

Cites Work

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• Farsighted coalitional stability
• An Equilibrium-Point Interpretation of Stable Sets and a Proposed Alternative Definition
• Multistage Situations

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