Coalition formation under dominance invariance

DOI10.1007/S13235-022-00437-ZMaRDI QIDQ6176199zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Mert Kimya

Publication date 25 July 2023

Published in Dynamic Games and Applications (Search for Journal in Brave)

Copyright license Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s13235-022-00437-z

zbMATH Keywords

coalitional gamesfarsighted stabilityfarsighted stable setlargest consistent set

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Games involving graphs (91A43)

Recommendations

• Farsighted coalitional stability
• The farsighted stable set
• Coalition formation among farsighted agents
• Rational expectations and farsighted stability
• Maximality in the farsighted stable set

Cites work

• A theory of endogenous coalition structures
• Absolutely Stable Games
• An Equilibrium-Point Interpretation of Stable Sets and a Proposed Alternative Definition
• Coalition formation among farsighted agents
• Coalition formation and history dependence
• Coalition formation as a dynamic process.
• Coalition Formation in Non-Democracies
• Coalitional stability under perfect foresight
• Dominance invariant one-to-one matching problems
• Equilibrium coalitional behavior
• Farsighted coalitional stability
• Farsighted objections and maximality in one-to-one matching problems
• Farsighted stability in hedonic games
• Farsighted stability with heterogeneous expectations
• Farsightedly stable networks
• Full farsighted rationality
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 4172789 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3106184 (Why is no real title available?)
• Matching with myopic and farsighted players
• Maximality in the farsighted stable set
• Networks and farsighted stability
• Nonemptiness of the largest consistent set
• Rational expectations and farsighted stability
• Rationalizability for social environments
• Sequential formation of coalitions in games with externalities and fixed payoff division
• Stability of alliance networks
• Stability of networks under horizon-\(K\) farsightedness
• The farsighted stable set
• The theory of social situations. A game-theoretic approach.
• von Neumann-Morgenstern farsightedly stable sets in two-sided matching
• Voting for voters: A model of electoral evolution

Cited in

(8)

• The equivalence of the minimal dominant set and the myopic stable set for coalition function form games
• Dominance invariant one-to-one matching problems
• Preface to the special issue on ``Group formation and farsightedness
• Credible sets
• Matching markets with farsighted couples
• Two solutions on TU games with preference relations: the core and the globally stable solution
• Axiomatization of the farsighted stable set and the (strong) rational expectations farsighted stable set
• Coalitions under a competition mechanism of resource allocation

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