Coalition formation under dominance invariance
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Publication:6176199
DOI10.1007/s13235-022-00437-zzbMath1520.91034OpenAlexW3186436861MaRDI QIDQ6176199
Publication date: 25 July 2023
Published in: Dynamic Games and Applications (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13235-022-00437-z
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