Coalition formation and history dependence
From MaRDI portal
Publication:3299507
DOI10.3982/TE2947zbMath1440.91007OpenAlexW2756083707MaRDI QIDQ3299507
Hannu Vartiainen, Bhaskar Dutta
Publication date: 23 July 2020
Published in: Theoretical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.3982/te2947
Related Items (11)
Farsighted stability with heterogeneous expectations ⋮ Stability against robust deviations in the roommate problem ⋮ Myopic and farsighted stable sets in 2-player strategic-form games ⋮ Farsighted objections and maximality in one-to-one matching problems ⋮ Stability of alliance networks ⋮ Social rationalizability with mediation ⋮ Coalition formation under dominance invariance ⋮ Assortative matching with externalities and farsighted agents ⋮ Matching with myopic and farsighted players ⋮ Farsighted stability in patent licensing: an abstract game approach ⋮ Implementation in largest consistent set via rights structures
This page was built for publication: Coalition formation and history dependence
