Farsighted objections and maximality in one-to-one matching problems
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Publication:2675403
DOI10.1016/J.JET.2022.105499zbMATH Open1498.91281OpenAlexW3154782833MaRDI QIDQ2675403FDOQ2675403
Authors: Mert Kimya 
Publication date: 23 September 2022
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2022.105499
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