Farsighted objections and maximality in one-to-one matching problems
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Publication:2675403
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Cites work
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3106184 (Why is no real title available?)
- An Equilibrium-Point Interpretation of Stable Sets and a Proposed Alternative Definition
- Coalition formation and history dependence
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- Core in a simple coalition formation game
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- Equilibrium coalitional behavior
- Farsighted coalitional stability
- Farsighted stability in hedonic games
- Farsighted stability in patent licensing: an abstract game approach
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- Full farsighted rationality
- Matching with myopic and farsighted players
- Maximality in the farsighted stable set
- Pillage and property
- Rational expectations and farsighted stability
- Rationalizability for social environments
- The farsighted stable set
- Von Neumann-Morgenstern stable sets in matching problems
- Weak stability and a bargaining set for the marriage model
- von Neumann-Morgenstern farsightedly stable sets in two-sided matching
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