Coalition Formation in Non-Democracies
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Publication:3528167
DOI10.1111/j.1467-937X.2008.00503.xzbMath1144.91315MaRDI QIDQ3528167
Konstantin Sonin, Daron Acemoglu, Georgy Egorov
Publication date: 8 October 2008
Published in: Review of Economic Studies (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-937x.2008.00503.x
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