Coalition Formation in Non-Democracies
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Publication:3528167
DOI10.1111/J.1467-937X.2008.00503.XzbMATH Open1144.91315OpenAlexW3122496239MaRDI QIDQ3528167FDOQ3528167
Authors: Daron Acemoglu, Georgy Egorov, Konstantin Sonin 
Publication date: 8 October 2008
Published in: Review of Economic Studies (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-937x.2008.00503.x
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