Coalition Formation in Non-Democracies

DOI10.1111/j.1467-937X.2008.00503.xzbMath1144.91315OpenAlexW3122496239MaRDI QIDQ3528167

Konstantin Sonin, Daron Acemoglu, Georgy Egorov

Publication date: 8 October 2008

Published in: Review of Economic Studies (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-937x.2008.00503.x

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Voting theory (91B12)

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