Gamson's law and hedonic games

DOI10.1007/s00355-007-0220-9zbMath1142.91328OpenAlexW2129289913MaRDI QIDQ2467524

Shlomo Weber, Michel Le Breton, Ignacio Ortuño-Ortín

Publication date: 22 January 2008

Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10016/5513

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12)

Related Items (5)

Incomplete information, proportional representation and strategic voting ⋮ Stable coalition governments: the case of three political parties ⋮ Two hardness results for Gamson's game ⋮ Meritocracy, egalitarianism and the stability of majoritarian organizations ⋮ Internal hierarchy and stable coalition structures

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• The stability of hedonic coalition structures
• Strong Tiebout equilibrium under restricted preferences domain
• Coalition and party formation in a legislative voting game
• Analysis of QM rules in the draft constitution for Europe proposed by the European Convention, 2003
• Core in a simple coalition formation game
• The Treaty of Nice and qualified majority voting
• Gamson's Law versus non-cooperative bargaining theory
• Coalition Formation in Non-Democracies

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