Incomplete information, proportional representation and strategic voting
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Publication:2361509
DOI10.1007/s00355-016-0995-7zbMath1392.91041OpenAlexW2524111803MaRDI QIDQ2361509
Dimitrios Xefteris, Orestis Troumpounis
Publication date: 30 June 2017
Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://www.lancaster.ac.uk/media/lancaster-university/content-assets/documents/lums/economics/working-papers/LancasterWP2015_007.pdf
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