Gamson's Law versus non-cooperative bargaining theory

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2004.11.003zbMath1090.91506MaRDI QIDQ2485487

Guillaume R. Fréchette, Massimo Morelli, John H. Kagel

Publication date: 5 August 2005

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2004.11.003

zbMATH Keywords

Baron-Ferejohn; Demand bargaining; Gamson's Law; Legislative bargaining; Nominal bargaining power

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

91A12: Cooperative games

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• Experiments in Majoritarian Bargaining