Behavioral Identification in Coalitional Bargaining: An Experimental Analysis of Demand Bargaining and Alternating Offers
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Publication:5393921
DOI10.1111/j.1468-0262.2005.00641.xzbMath1152.91459MaRDI QIDQ5393921
Massimo Morelli, John H. Kagel, Guillaume R. Fréchette
Publication date: 24 October 2006
Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0262.2005.00641.x
91A12: Cooperative games
91B12: Voting theory
91B26: Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models
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