Pork versus public goods: an experimental study of public good provision within a legislative bargaining framework
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Cites work
- A Theory of Fairness, Competition, and Cooperation
- A stress test of fairness measures in models of social utility
- Behavioral Identification in Coalitional Bargaining: An Experimental Analysis of Demand Bargaining and Alternating Offers
- Coalition and party formation in a legislative voting game
- Elections, governments, and parliaments in proportional representation systems
- Leading-by-example and signaling in voluntary contribution games: an experimental study
- Partners and strangers revisited
- The dynamics of distributive politics
- The role of risk preferences in bargaining when acceptance of a proposal requires less than unanimous approval
- Understanding Social Preferences with Simple Tests
- Veto power in committees: An experimental study
Cited in
(6)- Common agency lobbying over coalitions and policy
- Introduction to the symposium in political economy
- Multilateral bargaining over the division of losses
- Legislative bargaining with heterogeneous disagreement values: theory and experiments
- Public good provision in legislatures: the dynamics of enlargements
- The dynamics of distributive politics
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