Demand commitments in majority bargaining or how formateurs get their way

DOI10.1007/S00182-008-0144-3zbMATH Open1211.91131OpenAlexW2045121063MaRDI QIDQ532664FDOQ532664

Authors: Yves Breitmoser 

Publication date: 5 May 2011

Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-008-0144-3

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zbMATH Keywords

non-cooperativedemand bargainingmajority decisions

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Cites Work

• Uniqueness of stationary equilibrium payoffs in the Baron-Ferejohn model
• Behavioral Identification in Coalitional Bargaining: An Experimental Analysis of Demand Bargaining and Alternating Offers
• Government turnover in parliamentary democracies
• Coalition and party formation in a legislative voting game
• Elections, governments, and parliaments in proportional representation systems
• The demand commitment bargaining and snowballing cooperation
• Bargaining with commitments
• Bargaining and strategic demand commitment
• On implementation via demand commitment games

Cited In (2)

• Bargaining and strategic demand commitment
• Quantifying commitment in Nash equilibria

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