The demand commitment bargaining and snowballing cooperation
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This paper deals with a coalition game model with sequential demands and increasing cooperation readiness (the snowball effect), where the payoff units tend to zero. The main results show that in such games the equilibrium payoff distribution tends to the Shapley value. To derive this result the concepts of strategic equilibria and subgame consistency are used. The general results are applied to the problem of public good consumption.
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Cites work
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Cited in
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- Invariance and randomness in the Nash program for coalitional games
- Finite horizon bargaining and the consistent field
- Simple subscription mechanisms for excludable public goods
- Proto-coalition bargaining and the core
- The production and cost-sharing of an excludable public good
- A sequential bargaining protocol for land rental arrangements
- A Shapley-based Groves mechanism: when the mechanism designer plays the \textit{wise man}
- Majority rip-off in referendum voting
- A simple bargaining procedure for the Myerson value
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- On the nucleolus as a power index
- Corruption and power in democracies
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- Bidding for the surplus: a non-cooperative approach to the Shapley value
- An experiment on demand commitment bargaining
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- Demand bargaining and proportional payoffs in majority games
- Parliamentary bargaining with priority recognition for committee members
- Implementation of the levels structure value
- Efficient bidding with externalities
- Multilateral bargaining with concession costs
- Random marginal and random removal values
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