Finite horizon bargaining and the consistent field

DOI10.1006/GAME.1998.0665zbMATH Open1028.91509OpenAlexW2168043073WikidataQ56936142 ScholiaQ56936142MaRDI QIDQ1294033FDOQ1294033

Armando Gomes, Andreu Mas-Colell, Sergiu Hart

Publication date: 29 June 1999

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10230/463

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zbMATH Keywords

subgame perfectionnontransferable utilityconsistent vector fieldnoncooperative bargaining games

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) (n)-person games, (n>2) (91A06)

Cites Work

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• The Bargaining Problem
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• Bargaining and Value
• The consistent Shapley value for hyperplane games
• Bargaining Foundations of Shapely Value
• Ståhl's bargaining model
• The demand commitment bargaining and snowballing cooperation
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• Harsanyi values of large economies: Nonequivalence to competitive equilibria
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Cited In (4)

• Integrating Raiffa and Nash approaches to bargaining using interim agreements
• Supporting others and the evolution of influence.
• A characterization of a limit solution for finite horizon bargaining problems
• The procedural value for cooperative games with non-transferable utility

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