Finite horizon bargaining and the consistent field

DOI10.1006/GAME.1998.0665MaRDI QIDQ1294033zbMATH OpenOpenAlexWikidataFDO

Authors Armando Gomes, Sergiu Hart, Andreu Mas-Colell

Publication date 29 June 1999

Published in Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Copyright license Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International

Full work available at URL http://hdl.handle.net/10230/463

zbMATH Keywords

subgame perfectionnontransferable utilityconsistent vector fieldnoncooperative bargaining games

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) (n)-person games, (n>2) (91A06)

Recommendations

• Bargaining and Value
• Perfect equilibria of a model of n-person noncooperative bargaining
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 592684

Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3137856 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 4170685 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3743047 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3772598 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 54098 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3484411 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 910813 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3078997 (Why is no real title available?)
• Bargaining Foundations of Shapely Value
• Bargaining and Value
• Harsanyi values of large economies: Nonequivalence to competitive equilibria
• Ståhl's bargaining model
• The bargaining problem
• The consistent Shapley value for hyperplane games
• The demand commitment bargaining and snowballing cooperation

Cited in

(4)

• Supporting others and the evolution of influence.
• Integrating Raiffa and Nash approaches to bargaining using interim agreements
• A characterization of a limit solution for finite horizon bargaining problems
• The procedural value for cooperative games with non-transferable utility

This page was built for publication: Finite horizon bargaining and the consistent field

Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q1294033)