A characterization of a limit solution for finite horizon bargaining problems
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Cites work
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 49749 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3079001 (Why is no real title available?)
- A dynamic equilibrium model of search, bargaining, and money
- An exact non-cooperative support for the sequential Raiffa solution
- Axiomatic Characterizations of the Raiffa and the Kalai-Smorodinsky Solutions to the Bargaining Problem
- Bargaining and Value
- Bargaining in a non-stationary environment.
- Bargaining with Deadlines and Imperfect Player Control
- Characterizing the Nash and Raiffa Bargaining Solutions by Disagreement Point Axioms
- Deadline effects and inefficient delay in bargaining with endogenous commitment
- Finite horizon bargaining and the consistent field
- Generalized Raiffa solutions
- Involuntary Unemployment as a Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model
- Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model
- Robustness of intermediate agreements and bargaining solutions
- Ståhl's bargaining model
- The \(n\)-person Nash bargaining solution with time preference
- The bargaining problem
- Two-Person Cooperative Games
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