Bargaining in a non-stationary environment.

DOI10.1016/S0022-0531(02)00034-0zbMath1048.91010MaRDI QIDQ1810696

Abhinay Muthoo, Melvyn G. Coles

Publication date: 9 June 2003

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/s0022-0531(02)00034-0

zbMATH Keywords

subgame perfect equilibrium; alternating offers; bargaining solution

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

91B52: Special types of economic equilibria

91A12: Cooperative games

91A05: 2-person games

91A50: Discrete-time games

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