An exact non-cooperative support for the sequential Raiffa solution

DOI10.1016/j.jmateco.2010.08.011zbMath1211.91022OpenAlexW2134758708MaRDI QIDQ533917

Walter Trockel

Publication date: 10 May 2011

Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://pub.uni-bielefeld.de/record/2316443

zbMATH Keywords

implementationsubgame perfect equilibriumNash programRaiffa solutionnon-cooperative foundationsolution based social choice rule

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Cooperative games (91A12) Social choice (91B14)

Related Items (5)

A non-cooperative foundation for the continuous Raiffa solution ⋮ On the axiomatic theory of bargaining: a survey of recent results ⋮ A characterization of a limit solution for finite horizon bargaining problems ⋮ Generalized Raiffa solutions ⋮ How Best to Disagree in Order to Agree?

Cites Work

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• Robustness of intermediate agreements and bargaining solutions
• Ståhl's bargaining model
• An implementation-theoretic approach to non-cooperative foundations
• A comment on the Nash program and the theory of implementation
• The canonical extensive form of a game form. II: Representation
• Implementation of the Nash solution based on its Walrasian characterization
• Integrating the Nash program into mechanism theory.
• The Bargaining Problem
• Two-Person Cooperative Games

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