A characterization of a limit solution for finite horizon bargaining problems

DOI10.1007/s00182-011-0306-6zbMath1245.91003OpenAlexW1992825479MaRDI QIDQ444146

Hannu Salonen, Haruo Imai

Publication date: 13 August 2012

Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/2433/160135

zbMATH Keywords

Nash solutionbargainingdeadlineRaiffa solution

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

2-person games (91A05) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items

Computation of equilibrium values in the Baron and Ferejohn bargaining model ⋮ On the axiomatic theory of bargaining: a survey of recent results

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