A limit result on bargaining sets

DOI10.1007/s00199-017-1063-yzbMath1416.91136OpenAlexW2728740571MaRDI QIDQ1798799

Emma Moreno-García, Javier Hervés-Estévez

Publication date: 23 October 2018

Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-017-1063-y

zbMATH Keywords

coalitionscorebargaining setveto mechanismjustified objections

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32)

Related Items

Two characterizations of cost share equilibria, The Walrasian objection mechanism and Mas-Colell's bargaining set in economies with many commodities, Generalized coalitions and bargaining sets, Bargaining set with endogenous leaders: a convergence result, Fairness and fuzzy coalitions

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