A limit result on bargaining sets
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Publication:1798799
DOI10.1007/s00199-017-1063-yzbMath1416.91136OpenAlexW2728740571MaRDI QIDQ1798799
Emma Moreno-García, Javier Hervés-Estévez
Publication date: 23 October 2018
Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-017-1063-y
Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32)
Related Items (5)
Two characterizations of cost share equilibria ⋮ The Walrasian objection mechanism and Mas-Colell's bargaining set in economies with many commodities ⋮ Generalized coalitions and bargaining sets ⋮ Bargaining set with endogenous leaders: a convergence result ⋮ Fairness and fuzzy coalitions
Cites Work
- An equivalence theorem for a bargaining set
- A consistent bargaining set
- An advantage of the bargaining set over the core
- A new bargaining set of an \(N\)-person game and endogenous coalition formation
- A discrete approach to continuum economies
- Convergence of the Aumann-Davis-Maschler and Geanakoplos bargaining sets
- Topological methods in Walrasian economics
- The Incentives for Price-Taking Behavior in Large Exchange Economies
- Nonconvergence of the Mas-Colell and Zhou Bargaining Sets
- Markets with a Continuum of Traders
- Existence of stable payoff configurations for cooperative games
- A Limit Theorem on the Core of an Economy
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