Nonconvergence of the Mas-Colell and Zhou Bargaining Sets
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Publication:4359773
DOI10.2307/2171887zbMATH Open0898.90139OpenAlexW3022519690MaRDI QIDQ4359773FDOQ4359773
Authors: Robert M. Anderson, Walter Trockel, Lin Zhou
Publication date: 8 November 1998
Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://semanticscholar.org/paper/cb95ab2aa95c9ff90c2312b17c319c7f0b86d815
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Cited In (12)
- A noncooperative approach to the Mas-Colell bargaining set
- The anonymous core of an exchange economy.
- Simple strategy-proof approximately Walrasian mechanisms
- Competitive outcomes and endogenous coalition formation in an \(n\)-person game
- Bargaining set with endogenous leaders: a convergence result
- Bargaining set and anonymous core without the monotonicity assumption
- A limit result on bargaining sets
- Bargaining sets in finite economies
- Equivalence of the Aubin bargaining set and the set of competitive equilibria in a finite coalition production economy
- Coincidence of the Mas-Colell bargaining set and the set of competitive equilibria in a continuum coalition production economy
- Generalized coalitions and bargaining sets
- The Walrasian objection mechanism and Mas-Colell's bargaining set in economies with many commodities
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