Bargaining Foundations of Shapely Value

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Publication:3833834

DOI10.2307/1912573zbMath0677.90011OpenAlexW1596984324MaRDI QIDQ3833834

Faruk Gul

Publication date: 1989

Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.2307/1912573




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