Subscription mechanisms for network formation.
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Publication:1867527
DOI10.1006/jeth.2001.2920zbMath1038.91010OpenAlexW2137714003MaRDI QIDQ1867527
Publication date: 2 April 2003
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://semanticscholar.org/paper/a8e938f2e25b60a50ab88b3d7cd5673d5ff3cf6d
Related Items (16)
The formation of networks with transfers among players ⋮ Definitions of equilibrium in network formation games ⋮ Allocating value among farsighted players in network formation ⋮ Forming efficient networks ⋮ A note on network formation with decay ⋮ Listen before you link: optimal monitoring rules for communication networks ⋮ A non-cooperative approach to the ordinal Shapley-Shubik rule ⋮ A non-cooperative approach to the folk rule in minimum cost spanning tree problems ⋮ Forming coalitions and the Shapley NTU value ⋮ Networks and Stability ⋮ Strongly stable networks ⋮ Allocation rules for network games ⋮ Bidding for the surplus: realizing efficient outcomes in economic environments ⋮ Noncooperative cost spanning tree games with budget restrictions ⋮ Realizing fair outcomes in minimum cost spanning tree problems through non-cooperative mechanisms ⋮ Opportune moment strategies for a cost spanning tree game
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- A one-stage model of link formation and payoff division
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