A note on network formation with decay

DOI10.1016/J.ECONLET.2006.06.015zbMath1254.91061OpenAlexW2067164795MaRDI QIDQ1929488

Nobuo Matsubayashi, Shigetaka Yamakawa

Publication date: 8 January 2013

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2006.06.015

zbMATH Keywords

decaynetwork formationstrong Nash equilibriumefficient networkendogenous cost allocation

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social networks; opinion dynamics (91D30) Noncooperative games (91A10) Games involving graphs (91A43) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32)

Related Items (6)

Computing the strong Nash equilibrium for Markov chains games ⋮ Stochastic stability in one-way flow networks ⋮ Endogenous effort in communication networks under strategic complementarity ⋮ Network formation under negative degree-based externalities ⋮ Computing the strong \(L_p\)-Nash equilibrium for Markov chains games: convergence and uniqueness ⋮ Endogenous link strength in directed communication networks

Cites Work

• Subscription mechanisms for network formation.
• Forming efficient networks
• Strongly stable networks
• A strategic model of social and economic networks
• A Noncooperative Model of Network Formation
• A one-stage model of link formation and payoff division

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